




Working Paper No. 195 
OECD AGRICULTURAL TRADE REFORMS









1  Introduction..........................................................................................................1 
1.1 Motivation......................................................................................................1 
1.2 Selection  of  commodities...............................................................................2 
1.3 Objective........................................................................................................3 
2  Literature Review................................................................................................3 
2.1  Links between OECD policies and poverty...................................................3 
2.2  Key results from literature.............................................................................5 
3  Methodology and Data ........................................................................................7 
3.1  Changes in world prices.................................................................................8 
3.2  Price transmission: Border price to farm gate..............................................11 
3.3 Supply  response  model................................................................................12 
3.4  Welfare model -- Trade liberalization and poverty linkages.......................14 
4  Impact of Trade Liberalization on Prices and Production............................15 
4.1  Impact of elimination of subsidy on prices..................................................15 
4.2  Impact of elimination of subsidies on production........................................18 
4.2.1 World  production.................................................................................18 
4.2.2 India  production...................................................................................19 
4.3  Impact of reduction in tariffs and full liberalization....................................21 
4.3.1  Impact on prices...................................................................................21 
4.3.2  Impact on production...........................................................................22 
5  Welfare Gains Through Change in Price and Production.............................23 




 List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Sensitivity Matrix For Change In World Scenario........................................10 
Table 2: Per cent change in world price.......................................................................10 
Table 3: Changes in world and domestic prices due to elimination of subsidy in 
OECD for rice................................................................................................17 
Table 4: Change in production under alternative world demand and supply elasticity
.......................................................................................................................18 
Table 5: Impact of subsidy elimination on India’s production under alternative 
scenarios........................................................................................................21 
Table 6: Change in world and domestic prices under alternative scenarios of tariff 
change and full liberalization ........................................................................21 
Table 7: Impact of tariff change and full liberalization on India’s production under 
alternative scenarios ......................................................................................22 
Table 8: Impact of change in OECD policy on welfare of rice cultivating poor farmers 
in India...........................................................................................................24 
Table 9: Impact of change in OECD policy on welfare of wheat cultivating poor 
farmers in India..............................................................................................24 
Table 10: Impact of change in OECD policy on welfare of cotton cultivating poor 
farmers in India..............................................................................................25 
Table 11: Impact of change in OECD policy on welfare of sugarcane cultivating poor 
farmers in India..............................................................................................26 
 
 
List of Figure 
 
 
Figure 1: World and India Price Trends ......................................................................16 
Figure 2: World, India and OECD Production Trends................................................20 
 
 
List of Appendix 
 
 
Appendix 1: Reference matrix for world supply and demand elasticity .....................34 
Appendix 2: Regression between domestic and international price............................35 
Appendix 3: Supply response model and elasticity for paddy (rice) in India..............36 
Appendix 4: Supply response model and supply elasticity for wheat in India............37 
Appendix 5: Supply response model and supply elasticity for cotton in India ...........38 




Given the focus on global agriculture in the floundering Doha Round, it is timely to 
look into the impact of global trade liberalization on prices, production of major crops 
and the farmers welfare in India.  Domestic price support and export subsidies by the 
US and Europe have kept the world prices of agricultural products below the cost of 
its production. This has deleterious effect on the farmers from developing countries.  
This paper examines the impact of prevailing subsidies and of import trade tariffs in 
India and finds that even if product specific subsidies are reduced or eliminated, the 
price transmission mechanism is so poor that it will be difficult to pass it on to the 
farmers. As part of the study, Dr. Surabhi Mittal has also carried out simulations to 
assess the net impact of trade liberalization i.e. , abolition of subsidies and lowering of 
import tariff rates. She has also tried to emphasize the impact of trade liberalization 
on domestic prices and how these changes in agricultural prices may affect the poor 
farmer.  
I hope this paper will provide an insight into the understanding of domestic 
agricultural market interventions and border protection or export subsidies adopted by 
rich countries and their adverse impact on the agricultural sector of more than a 
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Rich countries use a combination of domestic market interventions and border 
protection or export subsidies as a part of their domestic policies. Developed countries 
such as the United States and the European Union (EU) resort to trade distorting 
policies to make their crop more competitive – both groups maintain high domestic 
prices for producers, stimulate production, and thus distort prices in the world market. 
The distorting effects of international trade can be distinguished between consumer 
surplus, producer surplus and tariff revenue approaches.  
 
The present paper emphasizes on the welfare of the producers with the main focus on 
small farmers. The analysis presented in the paper is an approximation of the general 
equilibrium analysis. The four parts of this approximation are: first, the estimation of 
the world price effect of removal of OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development) distortions; second, estimation of the effects of changes in world 
prices on domestic prices through a price transmission model; third, estimation of the 
impact on domestic production through a supply response model; and, four, the 
estimation of changes in supply and welfare on the poor small farmers.   
 
The simulation exercise shows that due to elimination of subsidies in OECD countries 
the world crop prices are expected to rise. The results confirm that the depressed 
world prices can be corrected by removal of OECD subsidies, but the challenge for 
India remains: How much can these price corrections benefit the farmers? India’s 
domestic price response to this world price change is very small for rice and wheat 
and slightly better for cotton and sugar. On the production front, with reduction in 
subsidies and rising of the world price, the production in OECD countries would 
decline, but it is not very clear if this would have a discernable effect on India’s 
production. In response to the rise in world price, this paper concludes that this 
change would have almost negligible impact on India’s production for rice and wheat 
and a marginal increase in the production of cotton and sugar. The welfare impact on 
small farmers based on these changes is also estimated. The important fact to be 
observed in this study is that the developed countries’ policies protecting their 
farming sector critically affect the lives of billions of people who depend on 
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1.1  Motivation  
 
The main objective of WTO (World Trade Organization) agreement on agriculture 
(AoA) was to encourage fair trade in agriculture by removing the trade distorting 
measures. It was expected that implementation of AoA would raise international 
prices of agricultural commodities and would improve the exports prospects of the 
country like India. However, contrary to this, the world prices had declined sharply, 
became even lower than the domestic prices, creating a more favourable imports 
rather than exports.   
 
Whilst most rich countries use a combination of domestic market interventions and 
border protection or export subsidies as a part of their domestic policies, developed 
countries such as the United States and EU resort to trade distorting policies to make 
their crop more competitive. Both groups maintain high domestic prices for 
producers, stimulate production, and thus distort prices in the world market. In the 
current negotiations under WTO it is being proposed to reduce the level of 
agricultural support in developed world, phasing out of trade distorting subsidies and 
elimination of export subsidies. Taking a long-term view, developing countries have 
been looking forward with a lot of optimism that distortions in agricultural markets 
will eventually be eliminated. The pressure for change in agricultural policies in 
developed countries is growing and there is a broad agreement that distortions in 
agricultural markets, including direct payment and border protection leads to 
overproduction and price decline, reducing opportunities for developing countries to 
expand exports.  
 
Trade liberalization affects poverty through multiple channels. The immediate effect 
is through change in price level, which would trigger exports and domestic prices 
would rise and equalize world prices. Apart from direct price effect there is lagged 
effect through agricultural wages and employment (Winters, 2002). Higher prices 
would stimulate production, which is expected to increase demand for agricultural 
labour, driving up wages and offering gainful employment. An increase in agricultural 
prices may adversely affect the net consumers of those agricultural products in the 
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short run, but the agricultural labourers and small farmers who supplement their 
incomes from agricultural wages could gain through wage and employment increase 
(Gulati, 2002). One consideration is that these price effects should get transferred to 
the poor.  
 
Thus, the key dimension of trade and poverty question include price transmission 
from the border to households, and its impact on production, wages, employment and 
poor producers’ welfare. The present study is based on the hypothesis that if the 
OECD agricultural policies change and domestic subsidies are eliminated and tariff 
levels are relaxed then there will be a decline in the production in the OECD 
countries, which will help the world prices to rise from a depressed level, leading to a 
boost in production in developing poor countries and bringing about a change in the 
welfare of producers in these countries.  
 
Cutting back on subsidies and other protection that primarily benefit relatively 
wealthy farmers in rich country markets and in some cases middle-income country 
markets can open up opportunities for poor farmers in developing countries. The 
effects on incomes in poor countries would be strong and immediate. In many cases 
the gains could be substantial, greater than the development assistance provided to 
these same countries.  
 
1.2  Selection of commodities 
 
For India rice, wheat, cotton and sugar are the important agricultural commodities. 
India is the largest producer of these commodities in the world. Rice and wheat are 
the major staple food in the country. A minimum support price (MSP) for rice and 
wheat is announced every year by the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices 
taking into account the cost of production and aiming at protecting the agricultural 
producers from any sharp fall in farm prices. India follows the procurement and 
stocking policy for public distribution of rice and wheat and the Central Government 
plays an important role in setting up the national agriculture policy in spite of the fact 
that agriculture is a state subject in the Constitution, therefore the state governments 
have to give their concurrence to the prices and policies drawn up by the Central 
Government.  
 
Cotton production policy in India has been oriented towards promoting and 
supporting the textile industry. Thus, prior to the recent reforms, the producers were 
heavily taxed by export controls aimed at providing low cost cotton to domestic 
textile mills. To encourage producers, the Government of India (GoI) announces a 
minimum support price for each variety of seed cotton. India is also the largest 
consumer of sugar in the world. GoI had totally decontrolled the sugar industry in 
2002-03 subject to futures trading becoming fully operational. A MSP is also annually 
announced for sugarcane. 
 
Gulati and Kelly (1999) estimated that India would be exporting tons of rice, wheat 
and cotton with globalization of agriculture. Gulati (2002) also found that India would 
be competitive in exporting sugar and cotton if trade liberalization takes place. Indian 
agriculture is getting connected to the world agriculture but the price fluctuations due 
to trade distortions are keeping the country away from being competitive.   
  3
1.3  Objective  
There are very few studies or database exercises which have investigated and 
identified the impact of OECD agricultural reforms (Annexure) on developing 
countries and its further bearing on poverty or welfare of producers. This is one of the 
first studies to quantify this impact on India, through a partial equilibrium analysis 
and simulation techniques. Sensitivity analysis is also done to have an estimate of 
changes in prices and production at alternative world demand and supply elasticity. In 
the study we are looking into the impact of elimination of domestic support and 
decline in tariff levels in the OECD countries on prices, production, quantify the 
effect of this price change on the welfare of farmers given their production bundles.
2 
The crops that are studied are rice, wheat, cotton and sugar. Thus, the main objective 
of the study is to  
1.  Analyze the impact of change in OECD agricultural policy - domestic support, 
export subsidy and tariff change (full liberalization impact) on world price, world 
production and OECD production. 
2.  Track the impact of world price change on domestic prices through a price 
transmission model. 
3.  Analyze the impact of change in domestic prices on domestic production through 
a supply response model. 
4.  Compute the changes in welfare of producers with main emphasis on small 
farmers, due to change in prices and production.   
 
2  Literature Review 
 
2.1  Links between OECD policies and poverty  
 
Agricultural products have the most distorted markets in the world economy. The 
OECD secretariat estimated in 2002 that support for agricultural producers just in 
OECD member countries totalled US$248 billion on average per year between 1999 
and 2001 (Townsend, 2003). The competitive situation remains severely distorted by 
high protection granted to domestic producers in agriculture, consumer goods and 
other industries, by major budget subsidies in agriculture (World Bank, 2004). Studies 
by UNCTAD (Supper, 2001) and Oxfam (Watkins and Sul, 2002) have investigated 
the extent to which distortions in trade have effected the developing country exports 
and found that U.S. cotton subsidies are destroying livelihoods in Africa by 
encouraging overproduction and product dumping.  
Estimates by the International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC) indicate that 
withdrawal of U.S. cotton subsidies would raise cotton prices by 26 per cent. 
Competitive countries have suffered as a result of both lower prices for exports and 
loss of world market share. Studies (Leetmaa, 2001; Hoekman et.al., 2004) show that 
distortions in agricultural markets lead to overproduction and price declines, reducing 
                                                 
2 It would have been idle to look into the consumption bundle also, but due to lack of data that can 
identify producers as consumers also; this study does not address the total welfare impact but only 
concentrates on the producer welfare gains as a measure of impact on poverty.   
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opportunities for developing countries to expand exports. Hertel and Winters, 2005, 
found that a 40 per cent reduction in agricultural tariffs, export and production 
subsidies results in global welfare gains of around $70 billion per year. For India, 
subsidies given by the United States to cotton producers means a huge loss as imports 
are flooding in and otherwise Indian cotton could have been much more competitive 
(Sengupta, 2003). It is observed that for most of the years in major agricultural 
commodities domestic prices are higher than world prices (Chand, 2002). Thus it is 
expected that the implementation of AoA the rise in the international prices of 
agricultural commodities would improve export prospects for India and other 
countries (Chand and Mathew, 2001). Although recent study by Dimaranan et al 
(2003) found that liberalization of OECD policies might hurt consumers in 
developing countries.  
 
Trade liberalization is widely considered as a positive contributor to poverty 
reduction, although the linkages are not direct. Thus we need to identify different 
characteristics of the poor including the information about their consumption, 
production and employment activities (Winters et al, 2004). The other key dimension 
of trade and poverty question is price transmission from the border to households and 
at farm gate, thus it would be due to factor price changes, higher wages, and change in 
employment level that a reduction in poverty could be anticipated. This has been 
shown in case of Brazil (Hertel and Winters, 2005).  
 
Another important link in trade and poverty analysis is change in wage-employment 
situation. Factor markets play an important role in the context of the linkages. When 
trade liberalization enhances profitability then the demand for labour is likely to 
expand. The majority of the poverty reduction is due to factor price changes, that is, 
higher wages, and change in employment level. Many of landless agriculture poor 
rely on labour markets for the bulk of the income. Thus the effects of trade reforms on 
wages and employment are important, especially for the unskilled. Due to trade 
liberalization and a consequent change in prices and production, either wages or 
employment or both is likely to increase. The proportional shock to earned income 
induced by trade liberalization depends on the shares of factors and household income 
and the proportional changes in the returns or wages (Winters et al, 2004). An 
alternative polar view of labour markets is that labour is available in perfect elastic 
supply in developing countries, thus the wages will be fixed exogenously and thus all 
the adjustments will take place in terms of employment. In India, there is an 
abundance of un- and under-employed labour in rural areas that can be drawn into 
agriculture without much change in wages. In this case the wages are fixed 
exogenously by what labour can earn elsewhere and the adjustment can take place in 
terms of employment. This linkage needs to be worked out through employment 
elasticity in agriculture sector. Insufficient data and elasticity computation posed a 
handicap in computing this aspect in this particular study.  
 
With trade liberalization, an increase in price of products, which a household is 
producing, would lead to an increase in its income and poor households gain from 
increased wages and profits (Singh et al, 1986). Households being consumers too 
might have to face the adverse effect of increased prices thus its ability to adjust to 
trade shock affects the size of any impact it suffers. Households will be exposed to 
new risks also but the net effect can reduce overall risk because the world markets are  
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often more stable than domestic ones (Winters, 2002). The developing countries with 
large mass of poverty often want to keep prices of agricultural products suppressed 
with a view to keep food within the reach of the masses. But this results in lower 
incentives to cultivators, which then forces the governments to extend non-product-
specific support to farmers. This is built in the structure of the economy (Gulati and 
Kelly, 1999). But for the developed countries, this PSE is even more distorting for 
farmers in the developing countries. There is deterioration in the relative productivity 
of labour in agriculture in the United States and EU countries on account of high farm 
support. The food surpluses of the farmers produced at high cost could not become 
competitive in the export market without heavy subsidies on exports. Developed 
countries have a tendency to subsidize agriculture because of unfailing regularity in 
the process of development (Hanumantha, 2001). An ideal analysis should try to deal 
directly with the effects of trade liberalization on the chances of moving into or out of 
poverty in an uncertain world. This requires information on the way that liberalization 
affects the distribution of shocks and households’ ability to cope with them. But 
inclusion of these factors makes the analysis very complicated (Winters, 2002). 
According to Sachdeva (2003) the internally domestic prices are affected and 
influenced by the low price and income elasticity, production, government 
interventions like minimum support prices and procurements, subsidies, devaluation, 
etc.   
 
2.2  Key results from literature 
 
Anderson and Valenzuela (2006) in their paper conclude that the global trade 
distortions are still harming the developing country farmers. The study shows that 
global liberalization would have a positive farm income rise for India. Hertal and 
Winters’ (2005) paper worked out that if Doha development agenda is implemented 
then employment of lowest skill workers in Brazil might get a boost by 40 per cent. In 
China, the poverty reduction would be fuelled by increased agricultural export to the 
highly protected agricultural market of the East Asia.  
 
The world rice market is highly distorted due to heavy support provided by Japan, 
Korea, Europe, and the United States to their rice produces. Total OECD support is 
more than $26 billion, and in Japan support is a staggering 700 per cent of production 
cost at world prices (Stedman and Edwards, 2005).  Gulati and Narayanan (2003) 
believe that with the removal of trade distortions in rice, there could be rice flows 
from poorer to richer countries. Thus, it can be expected that poorer countries such as 
Vietnam, Thailand, and India would be important net exporters while the richer 
countries such as Japan, Korea, and the EU would be net importers. Minot and Goletti 
(2003) predicted that the elimination of the rice export quota in Vietnam could raise 
prices by 14 to 22 per cent on average, and can be expected to reduce both the 
incidence and depth of poverty. Prospects for growth in trade therefore rely on policy 
reforms. Tariff and related border protection is very high, averaging about 40 per cent 
globally and rising to 200 per cent in some markets. The pattern of protection 
depresses world prices for high-quality, milled long-grain rice (Wailes, 2003). It is 
estimated that global reforms (elimination of all border barriers and support) could 
lead to average price increases of about 33 per cent, rising to 90 per cent for medium- 
and short-grain rice. Since most production is by small farmers in these countries, the 
gains could be very pro-poor as well. Liberalization is expected to help increase the  
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rice trade by 10-15 per cent. Production could continue its shift to developing 
countries, namely China, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, India and South America 
(Stedman and Edwards, 2005). Producers in poor exporting countries will benefit 
from a price increase of 25-35 per cent. Given the prevalence of small-scale producers 
in poor Asian countries, the poverty alleviation benefits will be widespread, even 
though consumers will pay higher prices.  
 
Farmers in EU have been encouraged to produce wheat with a combination of market 
price support (through intervention buying and export subsidies and direct payments), 
that contribute to over production and surpluses. Total production support averaged 
about $10 billion annually during 1999-2001, corresponding to a protection rate of 
almost 50 per cent. The prices were artificially kept higher than the world price. That 
time, EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has brought these prices equal to the 
world price. Since the cost of producing wheat is very high in EU, so to compensate 
farmers for reduction in intervention price, direct payments are given to farmers under 
various schemes, and they are encouraged to continue growing wheat even at a higher 
cost of production. This wheat is dumped into the world market at a price which is at 
least 40 per cent less than the other countries cost of production. This has extensively 
affected the farmers of developing nations.  
 
India has not yet established itself as a regular wheat exporting nation. The quantity of 
food grains allowed to be exported depends on the domestic demand-supply situation. 
In the era of trade liberalization, however, no such control can be expected to be 
exercised if production is plentiful. At present the stagnant production, increased 
demand and high speculation in the Indian market resulted in inflated wheat prices 
(Mittal, ET, 2006) and the government had to import wheat. Not much information is 
available which provides deep insight into the global changes due to the liberalization, 
more specifically about the removal of subsidies.  
 
Cotton is one of the most important cash crops in developing countries and small 
landholders play a major role in its production. Cotton production and processing 
employ as much as 7 per cent of all labour force in developing countries. About one-
third of raw cotton is traded. World trade in cotton shows severe policy distortions, 
but, unlike sugar, the distortions come through producer support rather than from 
border measures such as tariffs and quotas (Baffes, 2004). Agricultural subsidies in 
the United States are the main reason for a significant drop in world cotton prices, 
which have fallen by half since the mid-1990s. Costs of production in the United 
States are three times than in Burkina Faso, yet the United States has expanded 
production in the midst of a price slump. The United States provides the greatest 
support to its producers—$3 billion annually and the European Union about $0.6 
billion each year. Producer prices in the United States were 91 per cent higher than 
the world market price in 2001-02. High producer support encouraged the U.S. cotton 
production to grow about 25 per cent faster than world production after 1970, and EU 
production accelerated once. (Greece and Spain joined the European Community in 
1981 and 1986.) Economic models estimates show that if full liberalization takes 
place in the cotton sector then in next 10 years, cotton prices would increase by an 
average of 12.7 per cent over a price that would be prevailing in absence of reforms 
(CUTS, 2005). World cotton trade would increase by 5.8 per cent while Africa’s 
cotton export would increase by 12.6 per cent, Australia by 2.7 per cent, while exports 
from the United States would decline by 3.5 per cent. Cotton production in the United  
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States would decline by 6.7 per cent; in the European Union, by 70.5 per cent. In 
effect, cotton production in the European Union would fall back to levels that existed 
prior to the Common Agricultural Policy.  
 
The European Union, Japan, and the United States account for $6.4 billion of OECD-
zone support to the producers of sugar, which is approximately equal to developing-
country exports. Consequently, the world prices of sugar today are below the costs of 
production of some of the most efficient producers. The world market has shrunk to a 
trade residual, with an estimated 80 per cent of world production being sold in high 
priced, protected markets. Presently, developed countries are protecting their sugar 
producers at great cost to themselves and to developing countries with export 
potential. Study of the global sugar and sweetener markets (USDA, 2003) estimated 
that removing all trade protection and support would bring annual global welfare 
gains of $4.7 billion. For sugar it is estimated that with sugar policy reforms in 
countries with highest protection, net imports will increase by 15 tons per year. World 
sugar price could increase by 40 per cent, while sugar prices in countries that heavily 
protect their markets would decline. The greatest price decline would occur in Japan, 
where sugar price would fall by 65 per cent followed by 40 per cent decline in 
Western Europe and 25 per cent decline in the United States. Brazilian producers 
would gain the most from liberalization - about $2.6 billion per year but this gain 
would be partially offset by higher consumer prices. Japan’s net gain from lower 
consumer prices would more than offset lower producer prices on the 40 per cent of 
sugar that is domestically produced. In the United States, producer losses would be 
some $200 million greater than consumer gains. Western Europe would show a net 
gain of $1.5 billion, with consumer gains of $4.3 billion exceeding producer losses of 
$3.3 billion (Stedman and Edwards, 2005). Exporting countries that presently enjoy 
preferential access to the European Union and the United States now collect some 
$800 million by selling into protected markets at high prices. The rise of world sugar 
prices following full liberalization would partially offset the loss of preferences and 
allow some preferred producers to compete. The net loss to preferred producers from 
full liberalization is estimated to total about $450 million per year (Borrell and Pearce, 
1999; Sheales and others 1999).  
 
Estimates have been made to the effect that a complete removal of all trade distortions 
would increase net Indian agriculture export by about $2.7 billion a year, which 
would be a 50 per cent increase in the current levels of agriculture exports (Jha et.al, 
2003). 
 
3  Methodology and Data 
 
The study investigates into the impact of elimination of domestic support, export 
subsidy and decline in tariff levels in OECD countries on the production and poverty 
level in India. The linkages of impact of trade liberalization on production and 
poverty is through the change in price, production and its net impact on welfare of 
poor producers. The effects are based on elasticity of world demand and supply. Any 
change in international price would affect the domestic producers through elasticity of 
supply, and then the changes the welfare of producers through price and production  
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effects. These linkages are worked out using a partial equilibrium
3 and simulation 
techniques. Sensitivity analysis is done to have an estimate of changes in prices and 
production at alternative demand and supply elasticity. The models used for the 
analysis and data are discussed in detail below.  
 
3.1  Changes in world prices 
 
3.1.1 Impact on world due to subsidy elimination  
 
The change in world prices, world production, OECD production and rest of the 
world production is computed using the following model. The simulations are done 






Eliminating subsidies in country i would reduce the price received by producers from 
P+Si to P0. With an infinitely price elastic demand, production would fall from Q 0i to 
Q1i according to equation (1): 
 
Ln (Q 1i / Q 0i) = Es * ln (P0 / (P0+Si))     (1) 
 
This calculation is repeated for each country i (OECD – US and EU15 and Other 
OECD) in order to calculate the total amount which would have been withdrawn from 
the world market by eliminating subsidies with an infinitely price elastic demand. 
Equation (2) measures the extent of the horizontal leftward translation of the world 
supply curve.  
 
Q0 – Q1 = Σ(Q0i – Q 1i)       (2) 
 
The leftward shift of the world supply curve leads to a new equilibrium corresponding 
to price P0 and quantity Q2 satisfying equations (3) and (4) 
 
Ln(Q2/Q0) = Ed * Ln(P1/P0)       (3) 
Ln(Q2/Q1) = Es * Ln(P1/P0)       (4) 
 
Subtracting equation (3) from equation (4) gives the market clearing price P1 
Ln(Q2/Q1) - Ln(Q2/Q0) = Ln(Q0/ Q1) = (Es – Ed) * Ln(P1/P0) (5) 
 
In countries i, the price increase (P1/P0) induces the production increase Q 2i/Q1i 
defined  
                                                 
3 General equilibrium approach would be the best to understand the holistic impact of policy change on 
poverty as it takes into account the second-best welfare interactions. Due to data constraint, the 
present study choose to work in a partial equilibrium framework. This approach is less time-
consuming and needs relatively less data. The strength of the present study is that supply response, 
price transmission elasticity and change in world prices and production, due to OECD policy change 
is computed during the study and not picked up from the literature.   
 
4 Adapted from Goreux (2004)  
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by: Ln(Q2i/Q1i)= Es * Ln(P1/P0)      (6) 
 
The production decline shown in equation (1) is partly offset by production increase 
calculated in equation (6). Adding up equations (1) and (6) gives the production 
decline resulting from the elimination of subsidies: 
 
Log(Q 2i/Q0i) = Es*[Ln(P0/P0+Si) +Ln(P1/P0)] = Eo*Ln(P1/P0+Si) (7) 
 
In countries j, the price increase (P1/P0) induces the production increase Q 2j/Q  0j 
defined  
by Ln(Q 2j/Q 0j )= Es * Ln(P1/P0)      (8) 
 
After eliminating subsidies, the world supply Q2 calculated from equation (3) is 
identical to the sum of the quantities Q 2i calculated from equations (1) and (6) or 
directly from equation (7) plus the sum of quantities Q 2j calculated from equation (8). 
 
Where;  
i Subscript for countries with subsidies (OECD). 
j Subscript for countries without subsidies (Rest of the world). 
a Subscript for developing countries (subset of countries j). 
Si Subsidy granted by government of country i, in cents per dollar. 
P0 Actual world price with subsidies measured by Index A, in cents per dollar 
P1 Simulated world price after eliminating subsidies, in cents per dollar 
Q0 Actual world supply with subsidies, in thousands tons 
Q1 World production without subsidies and with infinite demand elasticity 
Q2 Simulated world production after removal of subsidies 
Q 0i Actual production of country i with subsidies, in thousands tons 
Q 1i Production of country i without subsidies and with infinite demand elasticity 
Q 2i Simulated production of country i after removal of subsidies 
Q 0j Actual production of country j without subsidies in thousands tons 
Q 2j Simulated production of country j after elimination of subsidies 
Es Price elasticity of world supply (positive) 
Ed Price elasticity of world demand (negative) 
Ln Logarithm 
 
The decline in production by the OECD countries will create supply deficit in the 
world market, which can be captured by the developing countries, based on their 




Based on the model discussed above the sensitivity analysis is carried out using the 
combinations of world demand and supply elasticity for each crop individually as 
presented in the simulation matrix in Table 1. Few elasticity’s could be obtained from 
the literature, thus for the simulation purpose the low, medium and high range 
elasticities are build around them.   
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Table 1: Sensitivity Matrix For Change In World Scenario  
 
Rice Wheat  Cotton  Sugar  Scenario 
Es Ed  Es  Ed Es Ed Es Ed 
Low  0.12  -0.02 0.10 -0.03  0.25  -0.37 0.11  -0.10 
Medium  0.50  -0.10 0.23 -0.11  0.47  -0.64 0.28  -0.20 
High  0.90  -0.50 0.38 -0.20  0.80  -1.27 0.40  -0.40 
Note: Es is World Supply elasticity; Ed is World Demand Elasticity.  
Rice and Wheat Es from Rosegrant et al (2001), Ed from Paroda & Kumar (2000); Cotton Es 
from Goreux (2004), Poonyth et al (2004), Becerra (2000), Ed from Goreux (2004) and Shui 
et al (1993); Sugar Es from Koo et al (2003), Meiners et a l (2003), FAO, Ed from Schmiz et 
al (2003), Meiners et al (2003). 
 
3.1.2  Impact on world due to change in tariff  
 
The change in world prices due to change in tariff structure and full liberalization is 
computed using the figures of changes in world prices available in the literature. This 
information is compiled for rice, wheat, cotton and sugarcane and presented in Table 
2 along with the source of reference. Different estimates are available from different 
sources based on the assumption and base years which may differ across studies used. 
Thus the present study uses these different estimates as scenarios and incorporates 
them in further estimation of welfare change.  
 
Table 2: Per cent change in world price  
    
Scenario 
1 














Rice 8.3  1.6  5.9  10.1  3.83 
Wheat 2.1  2.2  3.4  18.1  3.83 
Cotton 6.9  3.0  4.2  5.6  0.75 
Sugar 3.2  2.5  10.9  16.4  2.52 
Note: Cotton figures pertain to plant fibres information; Per cent change is from base year.  
Scenario 1 and 2 are from Winters 2005. Per cent are calculated at base year 2001;  
Scenario 3 and 4 are from USDA (Burfisher, 2001). Per cent are calculated at base year 
1997; Scenario 5 is from Polaski (2006). Per cent are calculated at base year 2001. 
Analysis for domestic price change is done for all the scenarios. The scenarios giving the 
maximum change in domestic prices and production are further used to see the impact on 
welfare change.    
 
3.1.3 Data   
 
The data for domestic support is aggregated for all the OECD countries from the 
countries’ notifications to WTO
5 by criteria of amber, blue, and green and export 
                                                 
5 All WTO members have to notify the Committee on Agriculture the extent of their domestic support 
measures. The listing is done for the Green Box, developmental measures, direct payments under 
production limiting programmes (Blue Box) and de  minimis levels of support. AMS (aggregate  
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subsidy. To ensure that the data is comparable across countries, we limit the analysis 
to domestic support for the major commodities that are notified to the WTO for the 
years 1995-2001/03 for rice, wheat, cotton and sugar.   
 
AMS
6 (aggregate measure of support) values are specified for both the product 
specific and non-product specific values of domestic support. Since the present study 
has a commodity specific approach, thus the non-product specific AMS is weighted 
by share of the crop in value of production for each country. This part is then added to 
product specific AMS and total AMS is constructed. Similar weighting is also done 
for Blue Box subsidies to get the product specific subsidy component. Data on 
production, value of production is compiled from WTO sites, OECD database.
7 The 
world market prices used for analysis is compiled from IMF-IFS statistics.  
 




An incomplete price transmission arise because of wide range of unclear factors such 
as transaction costs, market power, non-constant returns to scale, product 
homogeneity and changes in exchange rate (Conforti, 2004). Its difficult to 
incorporate all these factors, thus an alternative way is to estimate price transmission 
elasticity to deals with the price transmission between border and domestic farm gate 
price (Valenzuela et al, 2005). This elasticity takes into account the domestic and 
border policies and time trend that link the world and domestic prices. Price 
transmission elasticities were first proposed by Bredahl, Meyers and Collins (1979) to 
measure incomplete adjustment in domestic prices in response to changing world 
prices as a single parameter. They have since been used in other studies of wheat 
markets, such as Tyers and Anderson (1988) and Devadoss and Meyers (1990). A 
discussion of their use for policy representation in global models is found in Conforti 
(2004) and in Van Tongeren, Van Meijl, and Surry (2001). We follow the lagged 
price transmission specifications of Abbott (1979) and Collins (1980) to formulate a 
relationship between changes in international prices and domestic prices. Due to the 
                                                                                                                                            
measure of support) calculations and also and the Current Total AMS is also notified by each 
country. 
6 While both the PSE and the AMS are measures of domestic support, their concepts differ. For the 
present study AMS measure is thought to be more appropriate relative to PSE database for domestic 
policy reform using current WTO criteria. The PSE is a broad concept designed to measure overall 
developments in agricultural policies, across countries, based on a measure of current benefits to 
farmers (or costs to consumers and taxpayers). PSE has two components: market price support and 
budgetary outlays. It includes the effects of trade policies (import barriers and export subsidies) in its 
measure of market price support, which is calculated as the gap between the domestic producer price 
and a current world reference price times eligible production for each commodity. It also includes all 
government budget expenditures on farm programmes, including WTO exempt (Green Box) outlays 
that are made directly to producers, all of the WTO non-exempt (Amber Box) subsidies, and all of 
the WTO Blue Box forms of domestic support. 
7  Neither the OECD data nor the WTO data are sufficient for a comprehensive and consistent 
comparison of the impacts of domestic support policies potential production and trade distortions 
resulting from domestic support programmes. While countries report domestic support to the WTO 
the reporting is sporadic and considerable lags occur in reporting. The OECD scheme provides a 
comprehensive list of policy types based on the method of implementation; however the OECD 
classification does not distinguish between production distorting and non-distorting programmes.  
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prevailing annual shocks, short-run price transmission elasticity is used for analysis. 
The econometric specification is autoregressive, and takes the form of a partial 
adjustment model in which incomplete transmission arises from policy and 
institutional rigidities (Abbott, 1979). 
 
The data in the econometric analysis is expressed in logarithms to reduce data 
variability; the estimated parameter can directly be interpreted as transmission 
elasticity of domestic price with respect to world prices. The value of the parameters 
and their significance level provides information about the extent to which markets 
share the same price shocks (Conforti, 2004). A transmission parameter summarizes 
the overall effects of a set of factors affecting price signals. Since most estimation 
includes a constant term, they should include only the effects of those elements that 
change proportionally with prices. Two variations of the model are analyzed. One is 
with trend factor and other is without trend. General specifications of international 
price transmission through a partial adjustment model are of the following form: 
 
ln PDt =α + λlnPDt-1 + β lnPW t-1 + γT + εt   
 
where PDt is domestic price at time t; PWt is world price; T is time trend; β is a short-
run price is transmission elasticity.  
 
Price transmission elasticity indicates how much of a given change in the world 
commodity price is transmitted to the domestic price in the current period. The model 
is a partial adjustment model; OLS estimators maintain the relatively more important 
properties of consistency and efficiency (Greene, 2004). The error term (ε) in the 
price transmission model is assumed to be identically, normally, and independently 
distributed. Given the time-series nature of the data, we first investigate the dynamic 
properties of the price series through unit root and co-integration tests, followed by 
the possible adoption of an error correction model (Conforti, 2004). A key limitation, 
however, is that our annual price series covers 11 years only. This limits our ability to 
test the dynamic properties of the series and to test for serial correlation through a 
Breusch-Godfrey approach or similar method. Regressions are presented in Appendix 
2. 
 
3.2.2 Data   
 
The world price data is obtained from the IFS statistics. Domestic prices for the 
period 1990-2001 is compiled from FAOSTAT (2006). The study uses international 
prices of Thailand market for rice, Australia market for wheat, US Liverpool market 
for cotton and Caribbean free market for sugar. For domestic prices the study uses the 
market price of Kakinada, Andhra Pradesh, for rice; Sagar, Madhya Pradesh, for 
wheat; Abohar, Punjab, for cotton lint; and Hapur, Uttar Pradesh, for sugar.  
 




In a general framework, it is important to know how the producers respond to price 
change. The most plentiful evidence on production efforts concerns responses to  
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changes in prices, usually in agriculture, based on aggregate time series data. Many 
such supply response studies
8 have been conducted which suggest that producers are 
quite responsive to price incentives and other factors. With price change production 
level also change, talking into account the price level of competitive/substitute crops.
9 
The following log linear functional form of nerlovian supply response model is 
estimated for each crop. The elasticities formulation is also given below. 
 
statedummy Z Rain
F W Y P P A A
tlag
tlag tlag it jtlag itlag itlag o it
+ + +
+ + + + + + =
8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1
ln
ln ln ln ln ln ln
α α




Ait : Own Area; Pit: Own Farm Harvest Price; Pji: Competitive Crop Farm Harvest 
Price; Yit : Own Yield; W: Wage Rate; F: Fertiliser Price; Rain: Annual rainfall; Z: 
Other Variables 
 
Short Run Elasticity: Own Elasticity = α2     ; Cross Elasticity: α3 
Long Run Elasticity: Own Elasticity = α2 / 1-α1 ; Cross Elasticity:  α3 / 1-α1 
 
Supply elasticities
10 are computed by pooling the time series and cross section data of 
each crop separately. OLS and 2SLS techniques are applied to the model. Yield is 
being used as proxy for technology variable. Results are corrected for autocorrelation 
and hertoscedasticity. The elasticities from different literature sources as compiled in 





State-wise crop specific data on area, yield, production, use of inputs and their prices 
and irrigation is collected from various published reports of the Directorate of 
Economics and Statistics (DES), Government of India (GoI), and from the 
"Comprehensive scheme for the study of cost of cultivation of principal crops," of the 
DES are used in the analysis. Duration of period of data is 1980-2000. The missing 
year data on inputs and their prices were predicted using interpolations based on 
trends in the available data. Rainfall index for each state is constructed by averaging 
the monthly rainfall data for different centres of each state. The state average is 
weighted by the area under each centre. The data was obtained from various reports 
published by India Meteorological Department. Cropping patterns are investigated to 
identify the major states where a particular crop is cultivated. The states that together 
contribute to more than 95 per cent of India’s area and production are pooled together 
to compute the country’s supply elasticity.  
                                                 
8 Various research papers on Indian economy have computed these elasticities, but this study prefers to 
compute these elasticities on own. This is so because, different studies compute these elasticities 
with reference to different time periods, different regional zones and use different methodology.  
9 The study uses cotton and sorghum as competitive crops for rice, rapeseed  & mustard and sugarcane 
for wheat, coarse cereals for cotton and rice, wheat for sugarcane.   
10 Due to data constraint supply elasticity for different operational farm size groups can’t be computed.  
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There are a very few research papers done in India which have quantified the trade 
liberalization and poverty linkages. There is yet no universal conclusion as to weather 
a particular trade liberalization policy will increase or reduce poverty. Winters (2002) 
has developed a framework for exploiting the link between trade liberalization and 
poverty by considering its effect on the prices of tradable goods and then of these 
changes on households and individual welfare. In this framework, trade reforms and 
shocks trickle down to households via their direct effects on product and factor 
markets and indirectly through changes in the government revenues and social 
spending. All of these have implications for poverty. Through the price channel, trade 
induced price changes in product markets affect both the nominal and real incomes of 
households in their capacity as producers as well as consumers.
12 The direction and 
strength of these real incomes depend on whether households are net buyers or net 
sellers of the products concerned.  
 
The present study uses a similar approach to investigate the trade and poverty linkage. 
The model quantifies the effect of price change and production change on welfare of 
farmers, and poor farmers
13 in particular. The welfare change for the landless wage 
labourer would be estimated through employment change as discussed in Section 3.4. 
The study assumes that the supply elasticity to be same for all farm sizes. This is a 
limitation to the study because the small farmers will have a lower elasticity of supply 
response and a larger share of their total production in food crops vis-à-vis the large 
farmers. But due to data constraints separate supply elasticity can’t be computed.   
 
The following model (Sadoulet and Janvry, 1995) will capture the producer welfare 
effect through the producer surplus approach in a partial equilibrium framework.  
 
Welfare gain of producer (Changes in Producer Surplus)  
∆PS = q (p – p
b) – NSCP < 0    





 ; W = p
bq
b  
                                                 
11 The present study looks into the producer surplus to measure the impact of change in policy on 
poverty emphasizing on the small framers welfare. Producer surplus measures are only a rough 
gauge, a better measure would have been equivalent variation. OECD policies have a positive impact 
on consumers due to the inflow of cheap produce and also because in some products India might be a 
net importer only, thus a more liberal environment could affect consumers welfare. Studies have 
shown that a liberal environment would have an adverse impact on households that are eventually net 
consumers. Since the present study is looking into the welfare impact of only producers this aspect is 
not considered. Also the consumption information of the same set of producers is not available.  
 
12 The present study looks into the producer surplus only. Household consumer information is available 
in India which can’t be effectively compared with the state level producer information. This is 
discussed in detail in the section on limitation to the study.   
 
13 The poor farmers constitute the small and marginal land holders who have less than 2 hectares of 
land to cultivate.  
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Where: p
b = Border price; q
b = Quantity produced at the border price; p = New Border 





Information on operational land holdings by farm size is compiled from the different 
Agricultural Census, Agricultural Census Division, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Government of India. Supply elasticity, new prices and new quantity information is 
generated in this study itself.  
 
4  Impact of Trade Liberalization on Prices and Production 
 
A simulation and sensitivity analysis is done in this section to see the impact of 
change in different OECD trade policies on price and production both in the world 
and the Indian markets for rice, wheat, cotton and sugar.
14 The policy changes 
considered are first, if the subsidies are fully eliminated. Subsidies for the purpose of 
the analysis in this study are defined as the sum of Total AMS, de minimis, Blue Box 
subsidy and export subsidy. For rice, which is aggregated country-wise to get the total 
OECD figure. The sensitivity analysis is run at a range of low, medium and high 
world demand and supply elasticities as described in Table 1. The sections below 
individually talk about the impact on prices and production. The second policy 
analyzed is the change due to reduction in tariff and full liberalization. Simulations 
are done for 5 scenarios picked up from the literature.  
 
4.1  Impact of elimination of subsidy on prices 
 
The study follows the hypothesis that if the OECD agricultural subsidies are fully 
eliminated then it would no longer be profitable for the OECD farmer to produce for 
exports. In short run, some production could be withdrawn from the world market 
which makes the world market clearing price to rise from its depressed level. Thus, in 
long run as market forces adjust and the world market stabilize at a point where the 
equilibrium price is above the depressed prices. In this situation the existing shortfall 
in supply in the world market could be met by the other developing countries, which 
were earlier not competitive in the world market due to depressed prices.  
 
The percentage change in world prices based on the sensitivity analysis for range of 
world demand and supply elasticity are presented in Table 3. The results are given for 
nine scenarios which are the combination of the range of world demand and supply 
elasticity respectively for each crop. If the OECD subsidies are eliminated then price 
of rice could increase by 1.05-4.86 per cent in the world market. The overall impact 
on price change in rice would not be very huge. For wheat, the maximum change in 
world prices due to subsidy elimination could be 7.35 per cent and minimum could be 
2.61 per cent. Higher supply elasticity would give a higher change in price. For 
cotton, the world price might rise from its depressed level by 6.55 per cent to 20.85 
per cent. The overall impact on cotton price is quite substantive. Similarly for sugar 
this change in world prices could range between 7.45 per cent and 26.42 per cent 
                                                 
14 Detail in methodology section.   
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under alternative supply and demand scenarios. These simulations support the 
hypothesis that with removal of subsidies the price gain could be significant in the 
world market.   
 
For the changes in the world market to have an impact on Indian market it is 
important to understand the relationship between the world and Indian price series for 
the commodities. Figure 1 shows the comparison between the Indian price market and 
world prices for rice, wheat, cotton and sugar. It shows that over the last one decade 
the Indian rice prices have been lower than the world market prices and also the two 
price series don’t seem to correlate with each other. Indian wheat prices and world 
market prices series have been moving hand in hand. The world prices seem to impact 
the Indian market also. Indian cotton prices and world market prices follow similar 
trends and are not very different from each other. The two price series don’t seem to 
correlate with each other. Indian sugar prices have been higher than the world market 
prices and also the two price series seem to correlate with each other. 
 
 
Figure 1: World and India Price Trends 
 
The impact of the OECD policy change on the world prices get transmitted to other 
countries. This impact on Indian price market is computed through the price 
transmission model. The price transmission elasticity (PTE) is computed for all the 
four crops under two models, one with the time trend and other without the time 
trend. The PTE and regressions are presented in Appendix 2. The stationary tests, unit 
root test and co-integration tests are also performed to verify the results. The study 
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and production changes thus the PTE used for analysis are 0.049 for rice, 0.2 for 
wheat, 0.728 for cotton and 1.064 for sugar. The elasticity for rice is very small and 
statistically non-significant. The two price series are not co-integrated and are non-
stationary. This implies that the impact of change in world price on Indian rice prices 
would be almost negligible. This might be true in case of India because rice being a 
staple food is usually a controlled price market through the fixing a minimum support 
price by the Government of India, which does not allow the rice price to fall below it. 
The deficit supplies in the market are met either by release of government stocks or 
imports. The PTE for wheat, cotton and sugar are statistically significant. The Indian 
commodity market for these crops is co-integrated with the world market and thus it is 
assumed that the price rise signal in the world market will have a positive impact on 
Indian producers.   
 
The net impact of change in world price due to elimination of subsidies on the 
domestic prices is obtained by multiplying the per cent change in world prices with 
the price transmission elasticity. The results are presented in Table 3 under all 
alternative world supply and demand elasticity.  
 
Table 3: Changes in world and domestic prices due to elimination of subsidy in 
OECD for rice 
       (Unit:  in  per  cent) 

















E11  4.86 0.24 6.27  1.25 16.84  12.26 19.06  20.28 
E12  4.54 0.22 7.10  1.42 20.77  15.12 25.57  27.21 
E13  3.90 0.19 7.35  1.47 20.85  15.18 26.42  28.11 
E21  2.98 0.15 3.76  0.75 11.45  8.34 12.54  13.35 
E22  3.89 0.19 5.34  1.07 15.35  11.17 19.75  21.02 
E23  3.57 0.18 6.09  1.22 16.63  12.11 21.58  22.96 
E31  1.05 0.05 2.61  0.52  6.55  4.77  7.45  7.92 
E32  2.32 0.11 4.18  0.84  9.54  6.94 13.57  14.44 
E33  2.54 0.12 5.10  1.02 11.30  8.22 15.78  16.79 
Note: Ed and Es are different range of world demand and supply elasticity (Appendix 1) 
 
For rice impact of change in world prices on Indian price range from 0.05 per cent to 
0.24 per cent. This illustrates that in scenario E11 of the 4.86 per cent rise in world rice 
prices only 0.24 rice prices would increase in the domestic market. For rice the total 
price change advantage that the Indian rice producers might be very small as prices 
are not transmitted fully from border to domestic market. In case of wheat the world 
price change gets transmitted to Indian farmers by an increase of 0.52 per cent to 1.47 
per cent only. With the world price change due to elimination of subsidies, subsequent 
change in prices transferred to Indian market for cotton is of the range of 4.77 per cent 
to 15.18 per cent. The best possible scenario for cotton is scenario E13 which means 
that a 20.85 per cent rise in the cotton prices in the world brings a 15.18 per cent rise 
in the prices of cotton in the Indian market. In case of sugar the total change that the 
Indian sugar producers will face in terms of price change in the world is quite  
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substantive. This price rise could be as high as 28 per cent or minimum of 7.92 per 
cent.    
4.2  Impact of elimination of subsidies on production 
4.2.1  World production 
 
The changes in world prices as shown in Table 3 brings about a shift in the supply 
curve. The change in production levels of rice, wheat, cotton and sugar in the world, 
OECD countries and rest of the world is shown in Table 4. The simulations show the 
variation in the change in level of production with different combinations of supply 
and demand elasticity.  
 
Table 4: Change in production under alternative world demand and supply 
elasticity    
(Unit: in per cent) 
Crop OECD  Rest  of  the  World  World 
Rice  Es  0.12 0.50  0.9 0.12  0.50  0.9  0.12  0.50  0.9 
  Ed                
 -0.02  -10.14 -36.06 -55.53 0.57 2.24 3.51 -0.08  -0.07  -0.06 
 -0.10  -10.34 -36.26 -55.66 0.35 1.93 3.21 -0.29  -0.38  -0.35 
 -0.50  -10.54 -36.74 -56.06 0.13 1.15 2.28 -0.52  -1.14  -1.25 
Wheat  Es  0.10 0.23 0.38  0.10  0.23  0.38  0.10  0.23 0.38 
  Ed                
 -0.03  -1.33 -2.86 -4.63  0.61  1.59  2.75  -0.16  -0.19 -0.19 
 -0.11  -1.56 -3.23 -5.06  0.37  1.2 2.29 -0.4 -0.57 -0.64 
 -0.20  -1.67 -3.47 -5.36  0.26  0.95  1.91  -0.51  -0.82 -0.99 
Cotton  Es  0.25 0.47 0.80  0.25  0.47  0.80  0.25  0.47 0.80 
  Ed                
 -0.37  -31.48 -50.11 -69.36 3.97 9.27 16.35 -5.59  -6.74  -6.77 
 -0.64  -32.29 -51.17 -70.22 2.75 6.94 13.1  -6.7  -8.73  -9.38 
 -1.27  -33.04 -52.34 -71.31  1.6  4.37 8.94 -7.74 -10.92 -12.71 
Sugar  Es  0.11 0.28 0.40  0.11  0.28  0.40  0.11  0.28 0.40 
  Ed                
 -0.10  -10.85 -24.23 -32.54 1.94 6.58 9.83 -1.73  -2.25  -2.32 
 -0.20  -11.4 -25.23  -33.58  1.31  5.18 8.13 -2.34 -3.54  -3.83 
 -0.40  -11.85 -26.33 -34.87 0.79 3.63 6.04 -2.83  -4.96  -5.69 
 
With the elimination of OECD subsidies the production of these commodities decline 
in OECD countries creating a deficit supply in the world market in the short run. As 
the prices adjust and reach equilibrium the price signals gets transmitted to other 
countries. In the analysis and results presented in Table 4 rest of the world mainly 
constitute of the developing countries. After price transmission the production level in 
rest of the world is expected to increase in the long run. The world market is left with 
a supply shortage but the magnitude is very small, thus in next lag of price 
adjustments the market economy would attain equilibrium. The decline in OECD rice 
production is responsive to the world supply elasticity. At a low supply elasticity the 
reduction in OECD production is low and at a high supply elasticity of 0.9 the decline 
in OECD production could be huge. The developing countries can benefit from the  
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decline in OECD production in the long run with the advantage of rise in world price 
and the world environment become more efficient for them to export their produce. 
These results are evident of the fact that the removal of production distorting subsidy 
could accrue benefits to developing nation which can further have positive 
implication on poverty reducing policies for poor farmers.  
 
With the elimination of OECD subsidies the production of cotton is most hampered in 
OECD countries. Since huge production distorting cotton subsidies are given to 
framers in OECD countries, these policy changes could have a positive impact on rest 
of the world production. Developing countries, which are efficient in cotton 
production, could possibly export to fill in the supply deficit created due to decline in 
OECD production. The OECD production of cotton could possibly decline by 31.48 
per cent to 71.31 per cent, in response to the lag of time the market signals can 
maximum lead to increase in production of other countries by 16.35 per cent. For rice 
and sugar also huge decline in OECD production is predicted to decline due to 
elimination of subsidies. These changes could possibly motivate efficient countries to 
produce more and export to have an access of the world market. Not many changes 
are anticipated in the wheat market.  
  
4.2.2  India production  
 
As discussed in the above section, a possible market supply deficit created can be 
captured by the countries which have surplus to export. This section looks into the 
possibility of India exporting the commodities to the world market. When we 
compare the production levels of India, world and OECD countries (Figure 2), it is 
seen that the total world production of rice was 399.2 million tons in 2005, of which 
86 million tons were produced in India alone and OECD countries collectively 
produce a mere 18.4 million tons. This proportion has been nearly same since 1990. 
India alone accounts for almost one-forth of world rice production and thus creates a 
major impact on world rice prices if a regular export of rice is done.    
 
In the total world production of wheat of 595.8 million tons in 2005, OECD countries 
have a big share of 50 per cent of the world wheat, while India’s share is only 11.6 per 
cent. As far as cotton is concerned, India produces only half of the OECD production 
and its share in the world share is very low. India is not a major producer of sugar, but 
the cost of production is quite low because it is produced from sugarcane as compared 
to the sugar beet used in most of the developed countries.  
 
With the change in OECD trade policy on subsidies, the change in prices would send 
signals on production level in India. The response of Indian producers to the change 
in world prices and domestic prices will have an impact on the production in India. In 
the partial equilibrium framework the domestic supply response model is estimated 
(Appendix 3-6) to get the long-run supply elasticity for India. The domestic supply 
elasticities used for the analysis are 0.374 for rice, 0.658 for wheat, 0.914 for cotton 
and 0.666 for sugar. The possible change in domestic production due to the price 
changes is presented in Table 5. The changes are presented with respect to alternative 
supply and demand elasticities (Appendix 1) and the change in world and domestic 
prices as presented in Table 3. 
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For rice and wheat the net impact of price change on India’s production is very small. 
This is because very little of change in world prices for rice and wheat gets 
transmitted to the domestic market. Only if the price transmission from border to farm 
gate improves then only the Indian rice producers can gain from the elimination of 
OECD subsidies.    
 
The reduction in OECD cotton production could create enough opportunity for India 
and other major cotton producing countries to export in the world market. The net 
impact of price change on Indian domestic production is quite significant. Under 
alternative scenarios and at different sensitivity level of supply curve the domestic 
cotton production change can range from 4.36 to 13.87 per cent. In case of sugar, 
India can have an edge over the other countries and the price signals transmitted to the 
domestic market could possibly increase the domestic production of sugar by 5.28 to 
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Table 5: Impact of subsidy elimination on India’s production under alternative 
scenarios 
        (Unit:  in  per  cent) 
Change in India production   Scenarios  
Rice Wheat  Cotton  Sugar 
E11  0.089 0.83  11.20  13.51 
E12  0.083 0.93  13.82  18.12 
E13  0.072 0.97  13.87  18.72 
E21  0.055 0.50 7.62  8.89 
E22  0.071 0.70  10.21  14.00 
E23  0.065 0.80  11.07  15.29 
E31  0.019 0.34 4.36  5.28 
E32  0.042 0.55 6.35  9.62 
E33  0.046 0.67 7.52 11.18 
 
4.3  Impact of reduction in tariffs and full liberalization  
4.3.1  Impact on prices 
 
The change in world prices due to reduction in tariffs and full liberalization has been 
picked up from some well known studies in literature as discussed in detail in Table 2. 
The Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 deals with tariff reduction policy and under scenario 4 and 5, 
full liberalization is taken into account.   
 
The results of change in world market price and further the price change transmitted 
to India is presented in Table 6 under these scenarios. If the tariff changes take place 
as per the Doha Round (Scenario 1) then the price in the Indian market could only go 
up by 0.41 per cent for rice and  
 
Table 6: Change in world and domestic prices under alternative scenarios of 
tariff change and full liberalization 
        (Unit:  in  per  cent) 
Rice Wheat  Cotton  Sugar  Scenario 
World India World India World India World  India
 
Scenario 1  8.30 0.41 2.10 0.42 6.90 5.02 3.20  3.41 
Scenario 2  1.60 0.08 2.20 0.44 3.00 2.18 2.50  2.66 
Scenario 3  5.90 0.29 3.40 0.68 4.20 3.06  10.90  11.60
Scenario 4  10.10 0.50 18.10 3.62  5.60  4.08 16.40  17.45
Scenario 5  3.83 0.19 3.83 0.77 0.75 0.55 2.52  2.68 
Note: Scenario 1: Doha Round tariff; Scenario 2: EU tariff elimination; Scenario 3: Global 
tariff removal; Scenario 4: Full liberalization; Scenario 5: Full liberalization. Per change in 
world prices is compiled from different sources
15.   
0.42 per cent for wheat. If only EU eliminates its tariffs then the price changes are 
very low for rice. A global tariff removal would have a major increase in the world 
and domestic prices both for rice and wheat. The maximum price change in the Indian 
                                                 
15 Also see Table 2.  
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market is observed under Scenario 4 of full liberalization. The world prices increase 
by 10 per cent for rice and 18 per cent for wheat. The price change transmitted to 
India could be 0.5 per cent for rice and 3.62 per cent for wheat. The amount of 
changes for rice and wheat are small because of these are staple food and due to the 
food security concerns not much price fluctuations are observed.  
 
For cotton under the tariff reduction scenario the impact on Indian prices might be to 
the tune of 2-5 per cent, and with full liberalization the price rise could be 4 per cent. 
The numbers show that the variations due to the change in tariff policy would not be 
as huge as the gains that India might accrue if subsidies in OECD are eliminated. A 
OECD policy change for sugar would reap the maximum benefits to India. A global 
tariff change could make the world prices to rise by 10.9 per cent and as price gets 
transmitted to India the Indian sugar industry could see a price hike of 11.60 per cent. 
This price rise would provide an incentive for the farmers to produce more and get 
better prices.  
4.3.2  Impact on production 
 
The price change and production change impact on Indian domestic market for rice 
and wheat is very small in the simulations for subsidies, tariffs and full liberalization. 
Under alternative tariff and full liberalization scenarios the maximum production 
change could be 0.19 per cent for rice and 2.38 per cent for wheat (Table 7). Since 
India is producing 22 per cent of the world rice, even a small change in world policy 
for trade liberalization will impact India’s rice production by 16 million tons.
16   
 
Table 7: Impact of tariff change and full liberalization on India’s production 
under alternative scenarios  
     (Unit:  in  per  cent) 
Change in India production   Scenarios 
Rice Wheat Cotton 
Sugar 
 
Scenario 1  0.15  0.28  4.59  2.27 
Scenario 2  0.03 0.29 2.00 1.77 
Scenario 3  0.11  0.45  2.80  7.72 
Scenario  4  0.19 2.38 3.73  11.62 
Scenario 5  0.07 0.50 0.50 1.79 
Note: Scenario 1: Doha Round tariff; Scenario 2: EU tariff elimination; Scenario 3: Global 
tariff removal; Scenario 4: Full liberalization; Scenario 5: Full liberalization. Per change in 
world prices is compiled from different sources. The figures in bold are used for calculation 
of welfare change in next section.  
 
 
For rice, the gains are far more from tariff reduction than from changes in subsidy 
levels in OECD countries. If the OECD trade policies change, then a competitive 
price could increase the chance for Indian rice producers to be economically viable to supply 
                                                 
16 0.19 per cent of total India’s production of rice of 86 million tons in 2005.   
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in the world markets. In case of wheat - since India is producing only 12 per cent of the 
global production - the trade liberalization policies might not have much impact on 
gains to the Indian farmers.  
 
The impact of change in price of cotton and sugar in the world market on India’s 
production could be to the tune of 4.59 per cent for cotton and 11.62 per cent for 
sugar. The change in OECD trade policies on India is quite substantive for both cotton 
and sugar. These two crops being more of commercial value could have a major 
impact on the welfare of Indian farmers as discussed in the next section. The scenario 
maximum price and production changes are selected under each policy scenario to do 
the welfare change calculations.   
 
5  Welfare Gains Through Change in Price and Production 
 
This section investigates the trade and poverty linkage through a producer surplus 
model. The model quantifies the effect of this price change and production change on 
the welfare of poor farmers. The poor farmers constitute small and marginal land 
holders who have less than 2 hectares of land to cultivate. The information on price 
change and production change has been computed in earlier section for rice, wheat, 
cotton and sugar. The study assumes that the supply elasticity is same for all farm 
sizes, which means that whatever is the size of land holdings the farmers respond in a 
similar fashion to price changes. This assumption has a problem, because the small 
farmers typically have a lower elasticity of supply response and a larger share of their 
total production in food crops than large farmers. But due to data constraints this 
aspect aggregate supply elasticity is only used as a proxy for small farmers. The 
model (Sadoulet and Janvry, 1995) as discussed in the methodology section of this 
study is used to get the results which are presented in the tables below. The impact on 
producer welfare is measured by change in producer surplus in this model.   
 
This study assumes that due to rise in prices and its implication on increase in 
production, the small farmers tend to produce more or even diversify in producing the 
crops that are more profitable. The crop substitution aspect is taken into account while 
computing the supply elasticities. In this case the net producer surplus is the welfare 
gain to the small producer which is a proxy to the net impact on his poverty level. 
This study does not compute actual change in poverty level. OECD report 
(Tangermann and Ash, 2006) say that all sectors could potentially generate $44 
billion welfare gains globally if trade protection and domestic support is halved. Most 
of these gains arise from agricultural reforms. Hertel et al (2004) also found that a 40 
per cent reduction in agricultural tariffs, export and production subsidies results in 
global welfare gains of around $70 billion per year. Impacts of liberalization on 
agricultural trade volumes are mixed -- while reducing tariffs tends to increase import 
volumes, reductions in production and export subsidies tend to reduce volumes.  
 
Tables 8-11 discuss the impact of change in OECD policies on the welfare of poor 
farmers in India. The results are presented under alternative scenarios of elimination 
of subsidies, tariff reduction and full liberalization. The details of these scenarios and 
assumptions behind them have been discussed in earlier sections of the study. The net 
impact of the policy change on small farmers who are cultivating rice or wheat is very 
small or almost negligible. For rice (Table 8) the per cent change in production due to  
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subsidy elimination is 0.09 per cent and if tariff reduction takes place then it is 0.15 
 
Table 8: Impact of change in OECD policy on welfare of rice cultivating poor 








Change in Production (%)  0.09  0.15  0.19 
New Total Production 
(mt) 
89.41 89.47  89.50 
New Production of poor  
farmers (mt) 
74.15 74.26  74.29 
Change in Prices (%)  0.24  0.41  0.49 
New Domestic Price 
($/mt) 
114.71 114.91  115.01 
NSCP ($)  0.01  0.03  0.04 
Producer Gain ($)  20.21  34.54  42.04 
Welfare Gain (%)  0.24 0.41  0.50 
 
per cent and is 0.19 per cent in case of full liberalization. The price change varies 
from 0.24 per cent to 0.49 per cent under these scenarios. The net social change in 
production (NSCP) of poor farmers
17 due to the combined effect of price and 
production change is almost negligible. The welfare gain to a rice cultivating farmer 
will be 0.24 per cent in case of full subsidy elimination, 0.41 per cent in case of tariff 
change and 0.50 per cent in case of full liberalization. The welfare gains are producer 
gains as per cent of the new value of produce at new price and quantity. These 
changes are very small and in some ways are almost zero.   
 
A similar case is for the wheat cultivators in India. The welfare gains are better than 
that of rice cultivators but overall the net impact is very small. As seen in Table 9 the 
welfare gains to small farmers is only 1.48 per cent when there is full subsidy 
elimination, under the scenario of tariff elimination the impact on wheat farmers is 
even smaller. A full liberalization scenario might give them a welfare gain of 3.66 per 
cent. Both for rice and wheat the impact of trade liberalization in OECD countries is 
almost negligible. Due to food security concerns the prices of these crops are more of 
administered prices rather than being determined by the market. Farmers, especially 
small farmers, produce rice and wheat also for self-consumption and don’t take a big 
portion of their produce to market for sale. Because of this also the supply elasticity 
and substitution elasticity are small in case of these two crops.   
 
Table 9: Impact of change in OECD policy on welfare of wheat cultivating poor 
farmers in India  
                                                 









Change in Production (%)  0.97  0.45  2.38 
New Total Production 
(mt) 
72.98 72.60 74.00 
New Production of poor 
farmers (mt) 
55.55 55.27 56.33 
Change in Prices (%)  1.47  0.68  3.62 
New Domestic Price 
($/mt) 
149.03 147.87 152.19 
NSCP  ($)  0.57 0.12 3.48 
Producer Gain ($)  119.36  55.07  296.01 
Welfare Gain (%)  1.48 0.68 3.66 
 
In case of cotton, the poor cultivators see a change in production of 13.87 per cent 
after OECD cotton subsidies are removed. The results are presented in Table 10 for 
cotton which highlights the variations in the welfare gains that accrue under different 
policy scenarios. Under the scenario of subsidy elimination, the price gains to farmers 
are 15.18 per cent and producer gain of $242.67. A welfare gain of 16.23 per cent is 
evident if the subsidies are removed in OECD countries. Under alternative scenarios, 
a tariff reduction will bring about a welfare gain of 5.14 per cent to the poor cotton 
producers in India and a full liberalization will give 4.15 per cent of welfare gain. 
Thus the maximum gains come to the small farmers by subsidy elimination through 
increase in production. 
 
Table 10: Impact of change in OECD policy on welfare of cotton cultivating poor 








Change in Production (%)  13.87  4.59  3.73 
New Total Production (t)  2.97  2.73  2.71 
New Production of poor 
farmers (t) 
1.50 1.38 1.37 
Change in Prices (%)  15.18  5.02  4.08 
New Domestic Price ($/t)  1,304.81  1,189.80  1,179.08 
NSCP ($)  15.74  1.72  1.14 
Producer Gain ($)  242.67  76.84  62.10 
Welfare Gain (%)  16.23 5.14  4.15 
 
Similarly for sugar, the welfare gains are maximum when subsidy is eliminated in 
OECD countries. Among all the crops discussed above gains to sugar producers will 
be of the highest order. Table 11 illustrates the welfare gains to sugarcane producing 
small farmers. A 30.75 per cent welfare gain will accrue to small farmers under 
sugarcane cultivation. Under the scenario of tariff reduction these gains are of 12 per 
cent and with full liberalization the welfare gains will be 18.46 per cent.  
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The major gains for the small farm producers of cotton and sugar can also be seen . 
The results also vary according to the policy implemented. Different policy scenario 
give a wide variation in the welfare gains and thus the results are also indicative of the 
fact that if the small farmers are to be benefited then the right policy instrument is to 
be used to get them the maximum benefit of trade liberalization.  
 
Table 11: Impact of change in OECD policy on welfare of sugarcane cultivating 








Change in Production (%)  18.72  7.72  11.62 
New Total Production (t)  23.01  20.88  21.63 
New Production of poor 
farmers (t) 
16.51 14.98  15.53 
Change in Prices (%)  28.11  11.60  17.45 
New Domestic Price ($/t)  495.75  431.84  454.48 
NSCP ($)  141.67  24.11  54.58 
Producer Gain ($)  1,654.90  678.36  993.82 
Welfare Gain (%)  30.75 12.05  18.46 
 
6  Summary and Conclusion 
Rich countries use a combination of domestic market interventions and border 
protection or export subsidies as a part of their domestic policies. Developed countries 
such as the United States and EU resort to the trade distorting policies and make their 
crop more competitive – both by maintaining high domestic prices for producers, 
stimulate production, and thus distort prices in the world market. The study 
hypothesizes that if the OECD agricultural policies change and domestic subsidies are 
eliminated and tariff levels are relaxed then there will be a decline in the production in 
the OECD countries, which will help the world prices to rise from a depressed level, 
leading to a boost in production in developing countries and bringing about a change 
in the welfare of producers in these countries, which will have implication on their 
poverty levels. This is one of the first studies that quantifies the impact on India, 
through a partial equilibrium analysis and simulation techniques. Sensitivity analysis 
is also done to have an estimate of changes in prices and production at alternative 
demand and supply elasticity. In this study we are looking into the impact of 
elimination of domestic support and decline in tariff levels in the OECD countries on 
the prices, production, quantify the effect of this price change on welfare of farmers 
given their production bundles. The crops that are studied are rice, wheat, cotton and 
sugar, which are of vital interest to developing countries but OECD countries’ 
agricultural policies create considerable distortions.  
The scenarios considered here are, first when the total subsidies are fully eliminated. 
Total subsidies are the sum of AMS, de minimis, Blue Box subsidy and export 
subsidy for each crop, which is aggregated country wise to get the total OECD figure. 
The sensitivity analysis is run at a range of low, medium and high world demand and 
supply elasticities. The second scenario considered is change in tariff levels and third 
scenario illustrates the impact of full liberalization.   
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The per cent change in world price as an impact of subsidy elimination is ranged from 
1.05 to 4.86 per cent for rice, 2.60 to 6.27 per cent for wheat, 6.55 to 20.85 per cent 
for cotton and 7.45 to 26.42 per cent for sugar. The world price change due to tariff 
reduction and full liberalization are taken from literature. The impact on change in 
world price is transmitted to domestic Indian market. This impact is computed 
through the price transmission elasticity. The price transmission elasticity varies 
across crops. It is very low in case of rice and wheat. For cotton and sugar the price 
transmission from world to domestic market is quite substantive.   
 
Due to change in world prices the maximum impact on the domestic price under the 
scenario of subsidy elimination is 0.24 per cent for rice, 1.47 per cent for wheat, 15.18 
per cent for cotton and 28.11 per cent for sugar. Under the scenario of tariff reduction 
the domestic price is likely to increase by 0.41 per cent for rice, 0.68 per cent for 
wheat, 5.02 per cent for cotton and 11.60 per cent for sugar. For full liberalization 
scenario the price increase is estimated to be 0.49 per cent for rice, 3.62 per cent for 
wheat, 4.01 per cent for cotton and 17.45 per cent for sugar.  
 
As the world prices rise from the depressed level due to change in OECD policy the 
production of these crops on OECD show a decline. The decline is in response to the 
world supply elasticity. Total OECD rice production can decline by 10.54 per cent to 
56.06 per cent. The change in OECD wheat production is -1.67 per cent to -5.36 per 
cent, for cotton it is -33.04 per cent to -71.31 per cent and for sugar the change is 
expected to be -11.85 per cent to -34.87 per cent. The reduction in OECD production 
will create enough opportunity for market excess for the countries which are 
competitive and cost efficient in the production of those particular crops.  
 
At the domestic level the net impact of price change on India’s production is almost 
negligible for rice and wheat for all the policy changes. But when OECD subsidies are 
eliminated then the farmer’s response to price change is to the tune of 10 to 13 per 
cent for cotton and 13 to 18 per cent for sugarcane. The results vary at different 
elasticity level of supply response and price transmission. If tariffs in OECD are 
reduced then India’s domestic production in response to it might increase by 3-4 per 
cent for cotton and 7-10 per cent for sugarcane. 
 
The net impact of either of the policy change on small farmers who are cultivating 
rice or wheat is very small or almost negligible. The net social change in production 
by small farmers due to the combined effect of price and production change is almost 
negligible for these crops. The welfare gain to a rice and wheat small farmers is also 
almost zero. Both for rice and wheat the impact of trade liberalization in OECD 
countries is almost negligible. Due to food security concerns the prices of these crops 
are more of administered prices rather than being determined by the market. Farmers, 
especially the small farmers, produce rice and wheat also for self-consumption and 
thus don’t take a big portion of their produce to the market for sale. Because of this 
also the supply elasticity and substitution elasticity is small in case of these two crops. 
This also implies that the trade liberalization does not affect the producer of rice and 
wheat in the country. Any policy instrument of liberalization will not have a negative 
impact on food security or self-sufficiency of farmers and poor, unless the market 
forces are allowed to play their role.   
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For cotton, under the scenario of subsidy elimination, the price gains to farmers are 
15.18 per cent and producer gain of $242.67. A welfare gain of 16.23 per cent is 
evident if the subsidies are removed in OECD countries. Tariff reduction will bring 
about a welfare gain of 5.14 per cent to the small cotton producers in India and a full 
liberalization will give 4.15 per cent of welfare gain. Thus the maximum gains come 
to the cotton producers by subsidy elimination mainly through increase in production. 
Similarly for sugar, the welfare gains are maximum when subsidy is eliminated in 
OECD countries. Among all the crops discussed above gains to sugar producers will 
be of highest order, about 30.75 per cent welfare gain will accrue to small farmers 
under sugarcane cultivation. Under the scenario of tariff reduction these gains are of 
12 per cent and with full liberalization the welfare gains will be 18.46 per cent. The 
producer gains due to subsidy elimination is $1,654.90 for sugarcane producer. 
Different policy scenario give a wide variation in the welfare gains and thus the 
results are also indicative of the fact that if the small farmers are to be benefited then 
the right policy instrument is to be used to get them the maximum benefit of trade 
liberalization. This will have positive implication on the poverty level of these 
farmers. A boost in price and production will collectively help them to come above 
the poverty line. As the world prices will rise from the depressed level then the 
farmers will also find it profitable to produce for exports.  
 
The study has empirically highlighted that with the removal of subsidies and tariff 
changes, the world prices are likely to rise significantly and also the price distorting 
production in the OECD countries is likely to decline. This will help the developing 
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Appendix 1: Reference matrix for world supply and demand elasticity 
 
Rice Es 
Ed 0.12  0.50 0.90 
-0.02  E11 E 12 E 13 
-0.10  E21 E22  E23 
-0.50  E31 E 32 E 33 
Wheat Es 
Ed 0.10  0.23 0.38 
-0.03  E11 E 12 E 13 
-0.11  E21 E22  E23 
-0.20  E31 E 32 E 33 
Cotton Es 
Ed 0.25  0.47 0.80 
-0.37  E11 E 12 E 13 
-0.64  E21 E22  E23 
-1.27  E31 E 32 E 33 
Sugar Es 
Ed 0.11  0.28 0.40 
-0.10  E11 E 12 E 13 
-0.20  E21 E22  E23 








Appendix 2: Regression between domestic and international price 
 
Crop  Independent Variables  With Trend  Without Trend 
Rice PDt-1  -0.016 (-0.04)  0.391 (1.3) 
 PWt  0.002 (0.03)  0.049 (0.82) 
 Trend  -3.175 (-1.57)  - 
 Constant  6477.023 (1.59)  65.391 (1.57) 
  No of Observations  11 11 
 F  test  2.02 1.52 
 Prob>F  0.20 0.28 
 R-Square  0.46 0.28 
 Adj-R-Square  0.23 0.09 
 DW-Stat  2.05 1.99 
Wheat PDt-1  0.337 (1.70)  0.261 (1.23) 
 PWt  0.200** (2.39)  0.146 (1.72) 
 Trend  1.063 (1.68)  - 
 Constant  -2057.500 (-1.61)  85.978** (2.47) 
  No of Observations  12 12 
 F  test  2.6 2.07 
 Prob>F  0.12 0.18 
 R-Square  0.49 0.32 
 Adj-R-Square  0.30 0.16 
 DW-Stat  1.53 1.24 
Cotton PDt-1  -0.481*** (-2.12)  -0.337 (-1.44) 
 PWt  0.705* (0.00)  0.728* (4.55) 
 Trend  -19.818 (-1.75)  - 
 Constant  40610.920 (1.79)  790.996* (3.47) 
  No of Observations  12 12 
 F  test  12.62 14.15 
 Prob>F  0.00 0.00 
 R-Square  0.83 0.76 
 Adj-R-Square  0.76 0.71 
 DW-Stat  1.86 1.66 
Sugar PDt-1  -0.309 (-0.96)  -0.275 (-0.85) 
 PWt  1.064** (2.35)  0.866** (2.08) 
 Trend  2.213 (1.06)  - 
 Constant  -4433.475 (-1.05)  68.487 (0.42) 
  No of Observations  12 12 
 F  test  1.89 2.24 
 Prob>F  0.21 0.16 
 R-Square  0.42 0.33 
 Adj-R-Square  0.20 0.18 
 DW-Stat  1.86 1.88 
Note: Figures in Parenthesis is t-value.  * indicates at 1% level significant, ** indicates at 
5% level significant, *** indicates at 10% level significant. PDt-1 = Domestic Price (one lag) 





Appendix 3: Supply response model and elasticity for paddy (rice) in India 
Dependent Variable: log pdarea   
 
Variables  OLS  2SLS  OLS   2SLS   




































































































AR  (1)  -0.3602  -0.06208  -0.3608   -0.1059   
Constant 1.7381*  3.0883***   1.9903*    3.3963**  
N  180  171  180   171   
DF  163  154  161   152   
DW  stats. 2.0492  1.9819  2.0480   1.9938   
State 
Dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes   
Adj R Sq  0.99  0.99    0.99    0.99   
Note: Pooling of cross section time series data for 9 states (AP, HY, KN, MP, MH, OR, PB, TN, UP);  
These states together contribute to nearly 90% of area under cultivation and 92% of production 
of wheat in India.  
t-value is given in parenthesis.  
*: Significant at 1%; **: At 5%; *** At 10%;  
All the variables are in log   
Own crop is Paddy; CC1 Sorghum, CC2 is cotton; yield is being used as technology variable. Input price 
are relative to product price; results are autocorrelation and hetroscedasticity corrected 
Paddy price is Farm Harvest Price (FHP) 
Random effect, sig for brensch and pagan lagrangian multiplier test  
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Appendix 4: Supply response model and supply elasticity for wheat in India 
Dependent Variable: log wharea 
 
Variables OLS    2SLS    OLS    2SLS   































































































AR  (1)  -0.0572    -00629   -0.0747   -0.0045   
Constant  2.4645*    2.5736    2.2534*   3.0981***  
N  140    133    140   133  
DF  126    119    124   117  
DW  stats.  2.0232    2.0231    2.0359   2.0074  
State 
Dummies 
Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes   
Adj R Sq  0.99    0.99    0.99    0.99   
Note: pooling of cross section time series data for 7 states (BH, HY, MP, MH, PB, RJ, UP);  
These states together contribute to nearly 95% of area under cultivation and 97% of production of 
wheat in India.  
t-value is given in parenthesis.  
*: Significant at 1%; **: At 5%; *** At 10%;  
All the variables are in log   
Own crop is Wheat; CC1 sugarcane, CC2 is rapeseed and mustard; yield is being used as technology 
variable. Input price are relative to product price; results are autocorrelation and hetroscedasticity 
corrected 
Wheat price is Farm Harvest Price (FHP) 
Random effect, sig for brensch and pagan lagrangian multiplier test  
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Appendix 5: Supply response model and supply elasticity for cotton in India 
Dependent Variable: log Ctarea   
 
Variables  OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS  























































































AR (1)  -0.1911    0.8234    -0.1857   0.3607   
Constant 0.7575*    7.6134*   1.1303*   3.9327   
N  180    171  180   171   
DF  165    156  163   154   
DW  stats.  2.0966    1.7855  2.0928   2.13   
State 
Dummies 
Yes    Yes  Yes   Yes   
Adj R Sq  0.97    0.95    0.97    0.96   
Note: pooling of cross section time series data for 9 states (AP, GJ, HY, KN, MP, MH, PB, RJ, TN);  
These states together contribute to nearly 99% of area under cultivation and production of cotton 
in India.  
t-value is given in parenthesis.  
*: Significant at 1%; **: At 5%; *** At 10%;  
All the variables are in log   
Own crop is Cotton; CC1 is coarse cereals (Jowar, bajra and maize weighted average by 
production because all these are highly correlated); yield is being used as technology variable. 
Input price are relative to product price; results are autocorrelation and hetroscedasticity 
corrected 
Cotton price is Farm Harvest Price (FHP) 






Appendix 6: Supply response model and supply elasticity for sugarcane in India 
 
Dependent Variable: log Sarea 
           
Variables  OLS   2SLS   OLS   2SLS   































































































AR  (1)  -0.03488   -   0.00039   -   
Constant  -2.0104*   -1.3670*  -2.1865*  -1.5712*   
N  179   175   179   175  
DF  162   158   160   156  
DW  stats.  2.0145   1.9905   2.0063   1.9401  
State 
Dummies 
Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Adj  R  Sq  0.98   0.98   0.98   0.98  
Note: Pooling of cross section time series data for 10 states (AP, BH, GJ, HY, KN, MH, PB, RJ, 
TN, UP); These states together contribute to 96.7% of domestic area under cultivation for 
sugarcane and 97.08% of domestic sugarcane production. t-value is given in parenthesis. *: 
Significant at 1%; **: At 5%; *** At 10%;  
All the variables are in log. Own crop is Sugarcane; CC1 is rice; CC2 is wheat; yield is being 
used as technology variable. Input price are relative to product price; results are autocorrelation 
and hetroscedasticity corrected. Sugarcane price is Statutory Minimum Price (SMP). Random 
effect, significant for Brensch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test  
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Annexure 
OECD Policies and Reforms
18 
The level of support to farmers in OECD as a whole has not changed since 2000. 
Despite some major policy initiatives in 2002, there were no notable changes in the 
main policy instruments in most countries. There has been little change in the level of 
producer support since the late 1990s for the OECD as a whole. It has fallen from 37 
per cent of farm receipts in 1986-88 to 30 per cent in 2002-04 and 29 per cent in 
2005. These levels of support are very much the same as almost a decade ago and 
vary widely across countries and commodities. Annual fluctuations in the level of 
support mainly reflect policy measures limiting the transmission of international trade 
price developments to domestic markets. Policy reform has focused on changing the 
way in which support is being provided, away from the most production and trade 
distorting measures like import tariffs, export subsidy and domestic support, towards 
payments based on areas farmed and historical entitlements. While this shift may well 
continue over the coming years, production-linked measures still dominate producer 
support in most countries, encouraging output, distorting trade and contributing to 
lower world prices of agricultural commodities. An interesting dimension to the 
distortion effects of farm subsidy practices of the rich world is that all support to rice, 
sugar, and wheat is price support which is potentially most production and trade 




Domestic support OECD agriculture continues to be characterized by high levels of 
support. In 2004, the value of support to producers in the OECD as a whole is 
estimated at US$279 billion or EUR 226 billion. As measured by the percentage PSE, 
support accounted for 30 per cent of farm receipts, the same level as in 2003. 
Including support for general services to agriculture such as research, infrastructure, 
inspection, and marketing and promotion, total support to the agricultural sector was 
equivalent to 1.2 per cent of OECD GDP in 2004. A large difference in the level of 
support exists between countries. Within the OECD, support to producers in 2002-04 
was below 5 per cent of farm receipts in Australia and New Zealand. It averaged 
around 20 per cent in Canada, Mexico and the United States, and 25 per cent in 
Turkey. At 34 per cent, the level of support in the European Union (EU) was above 
the OECD average of 30 per cent. Support to producers in Japan and Korea averaged 
about 60 per cent and around 70 per cent in Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. 
Progress in reducing the level of support remains uneven across countries. Since 
1986-88, the level of producer support has fallen in most countries, remained constant 
in Norway, but has risen in Turkey. The largest decrease in the level of producer 
support has occurred in Canada, with other notable decreases in Mexico (since 1991-
93) and New Zealand. Among the high support countries, the greatest reduction has 
occurred in Switzerland. Total support to agriculture in the OECD has fallen from 2.3 
per cent to 1.2 per cent of GDP between 1986-88 and 2002-04. This is a similar trend 
                                                 
18 For information on OECD polices and reforms OECD website www.oecd.org and Agricultural 
Policies in OECD countries: Monitoring and Evaluation 2003, 2005; OECD Agricultural Polices 
2004, 2006, at a glance; are referred in general. For definitions WTO website www.wto.org is also 
referred.     
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for all OECD countries except Turkey where the share of total agricultural support in 
GDP increased, reflecting among other things, GDP levels and growth. 
 
Greater efforts have been made in changing the way in which support is provided to 
producers. The share of the most production and trade distorting forms of support – 
those linked to outputs or inputs – has declined from 91 per cent of producer support 
in 1986-88 to 74 per cent in 2002-04. A decrease in output linked support is also 
shown by a reduction in the gap between producer and border prices. In 1986-88, the 
average producer price in the OECD as a whole was 60 per cent higher than the 
border price; by 2002-04 the gap had reduced to 30 per cent. The largest reductions in 
the gap have occurred in Switzerland, the EU and Norway, countries with a level of 
support above the OECD average. However, most of the reduction occurred before 
the late-1990s. Reductions in these forms of support have been accompanied by 
increases in payments based on area or animal numbers or on historical entitlements 
that have limited the impact on farm receipts, with some payments having compliance 
conditions. Differences in support levels between commodities have declined but little 
reform has occurred in some sectors. Between 1986-88 and 2002-04 differences in 
support levels between commodities have declined in all countries, with the smallest 
decreases in the EU, Japan and Korea and the largest in Canada and Switzerland. The 
greatest reductions in the level and improvements in the composition of support have 
occurred in the sheep meat and grain (other than rice) sectors. Sugar, rice and milk 




The main conceptual consideration is that there are basically two categories of 
domestic support – support with no, or minimal, distortive effect on trade on the one 
hand (often referred to as “Green Box” measures) and trade-distorting support on the 
other hand (often referred to as “Amber Box” measures). Under the Agriculture 
Agreement all domestic support measures are considered to be production and trade 
distorting that fall into the Amber Box. These trade distorting measures include 
measures to support prices, or subsidies directly related to production quantities. 
These supports are subject to limits: “de minimis”
19 minimal supports are allowed (5 
per cent of agricultural production for developed countries, 10 per cent for developing 
countries); many of the 30 WTO members have subsidies larger than the de minimis 
levels and are committed to reduce these subsidies. At present there are no limits on 
spending on Blue Box subsidies.
20  
 
A t  W T O ,  d o m e s t i c  s u p p o r t  t h a t  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  m o s t  d a m a g i n g  i n  t e r m s  o f  
production and trade distortion falls into Amber Box and is subject to agreed limits. 
The agreed reduction commitments are expressed in terms of a total aggregate 
measure of support (AMS). Core problem with the present system of domestic 
support is that payments exempt under the Green and Blue Box provision covers a 
                                                 
19 In addition to measures covered by the Green Box, two other categories of domestic support 
measures are exempt from reduction commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture. These are 
certain developmental measures in developing countries and certain direct payments under 
production-limiting programmes. Furthermore, so-called de minimis levels of support are exempted 
from reduction. 
20 Any support that would normally be in the Amber Box is placed in the Blue Box if the support also 
requires farmers to limit production.  
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broad range of support measures (CUTS, 2005). Blue Box policies are still widely 
characterized as market distorting and many argue that the current Green Box policies 
can result in distortions. Several countries have been able to meet their AoA 
obligations by shifting support to Blue and Green Box without reducing their overall 
support. Since the commitment is on total AMS, not on product specific AMS, 
countries can reduce support for some products, while leaving support for other 
products untouched or even raising it from their original level (WTO site). Developed 
countries are also increasingly shifting their subsidies from prohibitive to non-
prohibitive categories. 
The reduction commitments are expressed in terms of a Total AMS, which includes 
all product-specific support and non-product-specific support in one single figure. In 
any year of the implementation period, the maximum levels of AMS are bound in the 
WTO. This system of reduction commitments, give room for the member countries to 
reduce the product specific support but still continue supporting a particular 
commodity through the non-product specific support. This movement between the 
subgroups of AMS help them to come under the allowed de minimis level, and thus 
can continue with the trade distorting practices.     
Export Subsidy 
"Export subsidies" refers to subsidies contingent upon export performance. The core 
of the reform programme on export subsidies is the commitments to reduce subsidized 
export quantities, and the amount of money spent subsidizing exports. An export 
subsidy increases firms’ incentives to export, and so will potentially affect both 
production and the allocation of goods between home and export markets. All such 
export subsidies are subject to reduction commitments, expressed in terms of both the 
volume of subsidized exports and the budgetary outlays for these subsidies. Export 
subsidies serve as policy instruments to OECD countries by which they can maintain 
producer prices at support levels above world prices (OECD, 2004, 2006). In the face 
of an export subsidy elimination schedule, policy-makers must choose whether to 
allow prices to fall below support levels or whether to control quantities (increase 
stocks or reduce production) to maintain prices at support levels. Often, quantity 
controls are in fact stated or implied by the policies in some countries, which may 
specify supply management schemes or trigger prices for purchasing public stocks, 
but applying such policies in the scenario produces results that are less comparable 
across countries and may not represent long-term solutions. 
Tariff 
 
In developed countries most of the agricultural products are protected by tariffs. The 
discussion of tariffs covers both tariffs on quantities within quotas and those outside. 
Traditionally, the tariff reductions that resulted from trade negotiations came from 
bilateral product-by-product bargaining, or they were based on formulas that applied 
over a broad range of products, or combinations of the two. The United States has 
gone so far as to argue that because so many agricultural tariffs are high, the 
negotiations to reduce tariffs should start with applied rates (the tariffs governments 
actually charge on agricultural imports) and not the generally higher bound rates (the 
legally binding ceilings committed in the WTO as a result of previous negotiations). 
This has proved quite controversial because it would break a tradition of basing  
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negotiations on bound rates. A number of countries have also countered that they 
should be given credit for unilaterally applying tariffs that are more liberal than the 
negotiated bound rates, instead of being forced to make even deeper cuts than 
countries that kept to their higher bound rates. In order to protect their own processing 
industries some countries see tariffs and other import barriers as necessary in order to 





Trade agreements can be a catalyst for agricultural policy reform. In 2004, almost all 
OECD countries were involved in either concluding or commencing implementation 
of bilateral or regional trade agreements. While these generally include an agricultural 
component, sensitive products are often exempt from liberalization commitments. 
After stalling in September 2003, the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) Round of 
trade negotiations was revived in 2004. Progress was made in establishing a 
framework for agriculture but many of the important details are still to be negotiated. 
While bilateral/regional agreements can trigger some policy adjustments, progress at 
the multilateral level is much needed to invigorate the process of agricultural policy 
reform. 
 
According to the official document of OECD (OECD, 2005), policy reforms in OECD 
has focused on changing the way in which the support is provided to the producer, 
with a shift away from the production linked measures. In spite of the shift the 
production linked measures still dominate producers support in most OECD countries 
is encouraging output, distorting trade and contributing to lower world prices of 
agricultural commodities. In 2004, the value of support to producers in the OECD as a 
whole is estimated at US$279 billions or EUR 226 billion. The level of producers 
support is largely different among the different OECD countries and also the process 
has been reducing the level of the support remains uneven across countries. The CAP 
2003 reform process tackled only one aspect of agriculture in the EU that of domestic 
subsidies. Although according to the OECD documents, some progress in reforms 
towards meeting the long-term objective of agricultural policy reforms in OECD 
countries has been seen. These reforms can be evaluated by examining the trends in 
three elements of production support – level of support, composition of support, that 
is, the share of the most production and trade distorting forms and the spread of 
support among the commodities. The trends in these three support elements for the 
OECD as whole show that there has been some progress towards the goal of policy 
reform, with some fluctuations. The ongoing trade negotiations in the context of the 
WTO Doha development agenda would stimulate the process of agricultural policy 
reforms in OECD. It would also ensure that appropriate commitments and disciplines 
are placed on the use of domestic support and export subsidies.  
 
Since 1996 the EU and the United States have substantially redesigned their subsidy 
system in order to move payments to farmers into the new categories and evade 
subsidy reduction. Thus, their farmers continue to receive subsidies. These encourage 
over production and much of the additional produce is thus dumped, that is, sold 
below the cost of production in the developing countries. These depressed prices, 
                                                 
21 Action Aid, a UK-based NGO, does not believe that either process by OECD or WTO will bring 
about significant reduction in subsidies that lead to over production and trade distortion.  
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make it difficult for the developing countries farmers to compete. Although 
developing countries are not obliged to reduce their subsidies under WTO rules if 
their support to agriculture is less than 10 per cent of total food output. But this clause 
is not used to the advantage of these countries due to lack of financial resources for 
support to farmers. Assessment conducted for the EU in February (Rice, 2003) found 
that when compared to 2002 production, the decoupled proposal in CAP 2003 would 
increase EU production for most cereals including soft wheat and rice.   
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